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ABSTRACT
The social force of race in relation to natural resources plays a prominent role in which communi-
ties are disproportionately a ected by pollution. Scholars have described how people of color 
are disproportionately victims of environmental discrimination and disparities because they lack 
the necessary social capital to bring attention to their plight, as demonstrated by the case of the 
Flint, Michigan, Water Crisis. In this article, we use a critical race theory lens to explore how the 
Flint Water Crisis constitutes a case study of environmental racism. More speci cally, we discuss 
the public health implications of environmental racism on the residents of Flint and conclude 
with a discussion of the overall implications of environmental justice for public health and social 
science research.
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Over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries, much attention has been 
paid to the inequitable exposure to pollution based on socioeconomic 
status. In the United States, sources of pollution, such as toxic waste 
dumps, incinerators, manufacturing plants, and other facilities, are 
typically located in lower income neighborhoods. The social force of 
race in relation to natural resources plays a prominent role in which 
communities are disproportionately aff ected by these environmental 
factors. According to Hines (2015),
racially based environmental discrimination was made apparent 
in 1971 when President Nixon’s Council on Environmental Quality 
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acknowledged that racial discrimination negatively affects the quality 
of environment among the urban poor. (pp. 198–199)
Scholars and activists have discussed extensively how people of color 
are more exposed to toxic waste, are disproportionately the victims of 
environmental discrimination and disparities, and suffer excessively 
from environmentally related health problems (Bullard, 1992, 1993, 1994, 
2000, 2001; Hines, 2015; Loh & Sugerman-Brozan, 2002; Mohai & Saha, 
2007; Ringquist, 2005). The term used to describe this phenomenon is 
environmental racism: racial discrimination in environmental policy 
making, decision-making, and practice that results in inequitable dis-
tribution of environmental burdens based on race or color (Bullard, 
2000). Most communities that are victims of environmental racism 
are poor and African American or Latino (Bullard, 1992, 1993, 1994; 
Bullard & Wright, 1986; Hines, 2001, 2015).
The challenge for environmental justice movements continues, as 
courts and governmental agencies typically require solid evidence of 
intentional discrimination in claims of environmental racism. However, 
a wealth of evidence exists that points to the linkages between pollut-
ants and the hazardous exposure of the communities that lie in close 
proximity to them. Numerous studies have examined the ill-health ef-
fects of exposure to pollutants (Downey & Willegen, 2005; Hines, 2015; 
Mohai & Bryant, 1992). Additional studies have linked diseases such 
as cancer, cardiovascular disease, birth defects, respiratory problems, 
and a host of other health complications to exposure to pollutants 
from industrial facilities (Collins & Williams, 1999; Roux et al., 2001; 
Geschwind, 1992; Lagatos, Wessen, & Zelen, 1986). Moreover, several 
scholars have discussed the differential environmental risks based on 
race and socioeconomic status (Bryant, 1995; Institute of Medicine, 1999; 
Mohai, 1996; Mohai & Bryant, 1992; Szasz & Meuser, 1997). While some 
would argue that class is the biggest indicator, research has shown that 
race cannot be separated from class because race helps to perpetuate 
a system of inequalities that create a space for acts of environmental 
racism (Charles, 2003; Feagin, Vera, & Batur, 2001). In response, envi-
ronmental justice efforts attempt to promote practices that enable equal 
protection. However, as critical race theory scholars have contended, 
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an unfortunate narrative frames racial practices like environmental 
racism as historical incidences that no longer exist (Delgado & Ste-
fancic, 2001; Dickinson, 2012; Tate, 1997). Yet, as the case of the Flint, 
Michigan, Water Crisis demonstrates, spaces continue to be sites of 
racialized practices and discrimination as the underlying historical 
and political economic relations of racial inequality are perpetuated 
in the present day. Unfortunately, the demographics of Flint, Michi-
gan, have made it the poster child for a community that was most at 
risk to experience the failure of our infrastructure in severe ways. The 
population of Flint is 56.6% Black, with a median household income 
from 2009 to 2013 of $24,830. Additionally, 41% of the population lives 
below the poverty line, and only 11% holds an education of at least a 
bachelor’s degree (U.S. Census, 2017). Consequently, the Flint Water 
Crisis represents an ideal environmental racism case study because it 
is a well-documented crisis that could have been prevented, echoing 
Rothstein (2016) that “Flint matters because the water utility industry 
can do better. The crisis, tragic in so many respects, also presents an 
opportunity for lasting benefit—benefit from recognizing that we are 
Flint” (p. 37). To understand the systematic factors that led to the Flint 
Water Crisis, we will employ a critical race lens to see how Flint has 
been a crisis in the making.
Flint Water Crisis
In April 2014, the city of Flint, Michigan, changed its water supply from 
Detroit-supplied Lake Huron water to the Flint River, as an interim 
source to save money while overhauling its supply system. Moving 
forward, it is important to emphasize that the single, unitary motiva-
tor for the switch from Detroit-supplied water to water from the Flint 
River was cost (Felton, 2016; Lin, 2016; Walters, 2016). Shortly after 
the switch, residents noted concerns regarding water color, taste, and 
odor (Carmody, 2016; Ganim & Tran, 2016; Ingraham, 2016; Laylin, 
2016; Lurie, 2016). Findings from FlintWaterStudy.org concluded that 
the water in Flint is 8.6 times more corrosive than water in Detroit 
(Siddhartha, 2015). However, independent tests by the Flint River 
Watershed Coalition contradicted this characterization. Their testing 
306 robinson, shum, and singh
found chlorine levels ranging between 49 and 81 mg/L.1 Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) secondary (nonmandatory) limit for chloride 
in drinking water is 250 mg/L, which is well above the level of the raw 
water from the Flint River, and the danger in exceeding this limit is 
merely “salty taste,” implying that the river itself cannot be to blame 
for corrosion (Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). This suggests 
that, although the river certainly has faced a sordid history with pollu-
tion, something else must have caused the corrosion that caused lead 
to leech into the drinking water.
Internal discussions and reports suggested that Flint’s water was so 
corrosive as a result of the City of Flint Water Treatment Plant itself. 
Prior to switching its water source to the Flint River, the City of Flint 
bought all of its water from the City of Detroit. As a result of this long-
standing deal, the Flint Water Treatment Plant ran only 4 days a year, 
serving primarily as an emergency backup (Schuch, 2014). Before the 
plant reopened, a series of poor decisions and oversights that would 
propel the crisis had already been made. Internal e-mails from Mike 
Glasgow, Flint’s laboratory and water quality supervisor, revealed a hur-
ried operation to reopen the plant by Detroit’s April 25, 2014, deadline: 
“if water is distributed from this plant in the next couple of weeks, it 
will be against my direction . . . but they [city officials] seem to have 
their own agenda” (Egan, Spangler, & Shamus, 2016).
In response to increased bacteria levels in the city water soon after 
the shift, the city increased the amount of chlorine it used to treat 
the water, in turn causing increased levels of THM, a dangerous by-
product of the disinfection process (Gottesdiener, 2015). In response to 
this problem, a report conducted by Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman 
Inc. recommended increasing the treatment dosage of ferric chloride, 
a coagulant that could help reduce THM levels (Gottesdiener, 2015). 
These two actions, however, had the unfortunate side effect of making 
the posttreatment water significantly more corrosive than even the pre-
treatment water. If the city had added any kind of corrosion inhibitor, as 
had been present in the water they purchased from Detroit, this would 
have been the end of their problems. However, city officials worried that 
adding phosphates, a common inhibitor, might feed bacterial growth, 
as those same compounds are frequently used in fertilizers (Flesher, 
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2016). Disturbingly, Flint officials knew that increasing the water’s 
ability to corrode, without adding any sort of inhibitor, was likely not 
to end well; yet, they chose to proceed with a wait-and-see approach.
In a September 3, 2016, email to numerous state and local officials, 
then public works director Howard Croft said a different concern had 
been identified. As the city water plant was designed to begin treating 
river water, “optimization for lead was addressed and discussed” with 
an engineering firm and the Michigan Department of Environmental 
Quality (MDEQ). Croft continued, “It was determined that having more 
data was advisable prior to the commitment of a specific optimization 
method” (Flesher, 2016).
We believe that this choice to take a wait-and-see approach, in the 
face of the myriad potential health problems caused by lead poisoning, 
demonstrates a clear negligence on the part of the City of Flint, yet the 
Flint River has become the scapegoat for the city’s inappropriate action 
(Carmody, 2016; Laylin, 2016). While the pollution in Flint certainly 
contributed to the crisis, emphasis on historic pollution rather than 
recent misconduct deflects blame from the people who directly allowed 
the crisis to occur. Therefore we agree with Brulle and Pellow (2006) 
that the exploitation of the environment and human populations are 
linked and that the key social dynamics that create this environmen-
tal inequality are (a) the functioning of the market economy and (b) 
institutionalized racism. In this article, we use a critical race theory 
(CRT) lens to argue how the Flint Water Crisis constitutes a case of 
environmental racism and to what extent. More specifically, we discuss 
the public health implications of environmental racism on the residents 
of Flint, Michigan, in terms of the ongoing water crisis and conclude 
with a discussion of the overall implications of environmental justice 
for public health and social science research.
Critical Race Theory
CRT was developed in the mid-1970s as a number of scholars noticed 
that there was a need for new theories and strategies to combat the 
more covert forms of racism that were gaining ground in the era. The 
basic CRT model consists of five elements: (a) the centrality of race 
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and racism and their intersectionality with other forms of subordina-
tion, (b) the challenge to dominant ideology, (c) the commitment to 
social justice, (d) the centrality of experiential knowledge, and (e) the 
transdisciplinary perspective (Solorzano, 1997; Solorzano & Yasso, 
2000). The heart of CRT lies in the rejection of color-blind orienta-
tions of equality, expressed as “rules that insist only on treatment that 
is the same across the board, [as this] can thus remedy only the most 
blatant forms of discrimination and instead calls for aggressive, color 
conscious efforts to change the way things are” (Delgado & Stefancic, 
2012, p. 49). Moreover, CRT argues for race-conscious decision-making 
as a routine, nondeviant mode to be used in distributing positions of 
wealth, prestige, and power (Guinier, 1995; Harris, 1995).
CRT also uniquely relies on narratives to substantiate claims. Ac-
cording to DeCuir and Dixson (2004), “an essential tenant [sic] of 
Critical Race Theory is counter storytelling” (p. 27). Deconstruct-
ing and understanding narratives can be used “to reveal the circular, 
self-serving nature of particular legal doctrines or rules” (Delgado & 
Stefancic, 2001, p. xvii). While many scholars argue for universalism 
over individual narratives, CRT emphasizes the role of individual nar-
ratives to the sense-making process, as we understand context through 
narrative. The unique focus on narratives coupled with a call for race-
conscious decision-making provides a useful lens when addressing 
the complexities of environmental racism overall, and in particular 
the Flint Water Crisis.
Flint and Environmental Racism
The case of the Flint Water Crisis demonstrates how the market econ-
omy and institutional racism have interacted in a manner to create a 
space filled with discrimination toward poor minorities. However, to 
understand the severity of the situation, we must look at the history of 
Flint. The Flint Water Crisis has been 150 years in the making due to the 
toxic legacy of the automotive industry operating in the city without 
penalty, in part because of weak environmental regulations (Carmody, 
2016; Craven & Tynes, 2016; Mailman School of Public Health, 2016; 
Morley, 2016). The weak environmental regulations were due in part to 
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the long-standing perception of the adverse economic effects of envi-
ronmental policies. Therefore this crisis lies at the intersection of this 
lengthy history of environmental pollution, racism, and shortsighted 
governance. Although we argue that the most tangible smoking gun for 
the crisis was the failure to use an inhibitor, such steps would not have 
been necessary were the pollution addressed appropriately—Flint is a 
derivative of a century of manipulation of the city’s residents (Rosner, 
2016). Thus we must examine every step at which these damning deci-
sions have been made to apply CRT properly.
Starting in the 1830s, industrial pollutants started to be introduced 
into the Flint River by way of the first lumber mills in the area (Car-
mody, 2016). Soon afterward, paper mills started to settle into the city, 
and with their arrival came chemical processing. The trend of pollution 
continued as the city began to grow, reaching a population of 150,000 by 
1930, as various industries arrived, such as the carriage and automobile 
industries (Carmody, 2016). During this time, untreated waste was be-
ing discharged downstream, and the effects of tainted water could be 
seen when the fish began to disappear, which was determined to be a 
result of lowered oxygen levels in the river (Carmody, 2016).
The problem of water pollution grew as General Motors increased 
its presence in the area in the 1940s through an investment strategy 
focused on rural and suburban areas, resulting in the creation of eight 
industrial complexes from 1940 to 1960 (Hakala, 2016). Although there 
were discussions about water pollution in the 1940s, no regulations 
forced businesses to treat and dilute their waste with city water until 
the 1950s (Carmody, 2016). Following these new regulations was a 
demand from the Michigan Water Resources Commission to Flint in 
1960 to “abate unlawful pollution of the Flint River” (Carmody, 2016). 
As a result, in 1967, Flint started to buy its water from Detroit, which 
continued to be the case until spring 2014 (Carmody, 2016; Mailman 
School of Public Health, 2016). General Motors helped to worsen the 
situation because by the 1980s, most of General Motors’s Flint plants 
were marked for potential noncompliance with EPA standards, partially 
leading to the closure of existing plants in Flint one by one (Carmody, 
2016). General Motors’s mistreatment of the people of Flint continued 
because the company had knowledge that the water supply was tainted 
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with high levels of chloride, which was rusting the company’s engine 
blocks (Colias, 2016). Rather than notify officials, General Motors simply 
switched its water supply, allowing the company to avoid a financial 
pitfall while the residents of Flint suffered.
However, simply to blame General Motors for negligence would 
paint an inaccurate picture of the forces that collided in Flint. The state 
government made numerous missteps in its decision-making approach, 
making them culpable for this crisis. When Michigan governor Rick 
Synder was debating whether to change the water supply, he did not do 
any pilot testing of Flint River water (Masten, Davies, & McElmurry, 
2016). The only pilot test occurred in 2002, a treatability study, meaning 
that the government was working with outdated information about the 
water supply (Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman Inc., 2015) When you 
consider the fact that the American Water Works Association clearly 
recommends that “if a municipality is considering changing how its 
source water is treated, the potential effects on the corrosivity of the 
treated water and the need for corrosion control should be evaluated,” 
and that no sufficient testing was ordered, the municipality did not 
look out for its residents (Masten et al., 2016; Muylwyk et al., 2014). 
This circulation of inaccurate information continued when the MDEQ 
incorrectly identified the Flint water supply as being safe for human 
use, which was then understood as accurate by other state agencies 
(Campbell, Greenberg, Mankikar, & Ross, 2016; Flint Water Advisory 
Task Force, 2016).
This poor decision-making continued even after government of-
ficials began to suspect a problem. Some of Synder’s staff realized the 
severity of the Flint water situation and attempted to advocate for a 
change in water supply, despite General Motors’s large role in creating 
the problem. For instance, Dennis Muchmore, the governor’s chief of 
staff, stated in a February 5, 2017, email,
Since we’re in charge, we can hardly ignore the people of Flint. After all, 
if GM refuses to use the water in their plant and our own agencies are 
warning people not to drink it . . . we look pretty stupid hiding behind 
some financial statement. (Covert, 2016)
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Additionally, like others on Synder’s staff, policy makers realized 
that although General Motors used the Flint area until it was no longer 
economically viable to do so, the State of Michigan still had a respon-
sibility to the people of Flint. However, instead of moving forward 
with switching the water supply, it took over a year for a solution to be 
partially implemented. This history, coupled with a massive decline in 
industrial and residential tax bases and lower city population densities, 
reduced the water demand in the distribution system, exacerbating 
problems with lead corrosion (Lewis, 1965; Zimmer & Hawley, 1956). 
Additionally, Carmody’s (2016) investigation shed light on the Flint 
River’s history with pollution, noting account after account of illegal 
dumps, industrial carelessness, and the mess that followed.
Even more troubling is that several former Flint residents were in 
positions of power within Michigan government. For instance, Michael 
Gadola, a former Flint resident and a member of Snyder’s legal counsel, 
voiced his concerns throughout the governor’s administration, but his 
opinion was never requested by Darnell Earley, the state-appointed 
emergency manager of Flint in April 2014 (Covert, 2016). Growing up 
in Flint, Gadola knew that taking water from the Flint River was a poor 
choice, but his position of power did nothing to help Flint residents, 
because the economic cost of an imbalanced budget was too much to 
bear (Covert, 2016). Compounding this, the MDEQ, the agency with 
the responsibility of keeping drinking water safe, had limited resources 
to monitor Michigan’s water (Roelofs, 2016). This combination demon-
strates one particular instance of environmental racism within the Flint 
Water Crisis: Despite personal narratives and a paper trail detailing the 
economic mismanagement, the people of Flint were continually ignored.
Many residents also took note of how their voices had been ignored. 
For example, resident Diane Thornton stated that the Flint Water Crisis 
was “a blind disaster” and that “if we would have had a tornado or hur-
ricane, they would have rushed in to help us” (Levin, n.d.). Instead of 
support, Flint residents were and are continuing to be subjected to unfair 
economic policies. A report by the Food and Water Watch (2016) found 
that residents of Flint faced the single most expensive water service in 
the entire country during 2015. The unfortunate irony of this situation 
was not lost on the residents of Flint, as resident Helena Jones stated: 
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“We’ve worked hard all our life, and we’ve paid our dues and pay our 
taxes. And this is what we get” (Berlinger & Netto, 2016). Currently 
8,000 Flint homeowners will receive tax liens because of unpaid water 
bills, which can result in foreclosure of their homes (Delaney, 2017). 
Furthermore, receiving these liens makes one ineligible for lead pipe 
replacement (Dennis, 2017). The overpriced water, threat of tax liens, 
and ultimately those liens disqualifying residents from lead pipe replace-
ment clearly demonstrate to Flint residents that the State of Michigan 
only considers their lives valuable if they can contribute economically. 
At this point, even if state officials were to radically change course, the 
damage would already have been done. Despite assurances that Flint 
is working to resolve the crisis fully, “nearly three years later, many 
residents still don’t trust the water. And they trust government officials 
even less” (Dennis, 2017)—and for good reason.
Most troubling about the Flint Water Crisis is that attention was only 
raised when a concerned team of physicians started to notice increases 
in lead levels in children. Attisha, LaChance, Sadler, and Schnepp (2016) 
tested children under the age of 5 years who had elevated blood lead 
levels in Genesee County and found a striking increase in the percentage 
of Flint children with elevated blood lead levels after the water source 
switch. According to Attisha et al.,
as in many urban areas with high levels of socioeconomic disadvantage 
and minority populations, we found a preexisting disparity in lead poi-
soning. . . . Flint children already suffer from risk factors that innately 
increase their lead exposure: poor nutrition, concentrated poverty, and 
older housing stock. (p. 286)
Following reports of increased blood lead levels in the children of 
Flint, who were disproportionately poor and African American, many 
began to question whether this issue constituted a case of environmental 
racism (Eligon, 2016; Shafer, 2016). As we have noted previously, the 
abhorrent series of policies regarding the residents affected by the crisis, 
as well as the negligence that allowed such a crisis to happen in the first 
place, most definitely constitute a case of environmental racism. The 
pollution of the Flint River, as well as the economic conditions suffered 
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by the people of Flint, created a dangerous intersection at which this 
crisis could happen. As the crisis played out, the response by state of-
ficials, discussed below, has demonstrated fully this systemic racism.
As more and more attention was placed on the crisis through social 
media and the sharing of narratives of residents, Flint city and Michi-
gan state officials started to lob accusations of blame back and forth 
at each other. As applying CRT requires identifying the true decision 
makers, we must wade through this fog of accusations to determine 
those responsible for policy. Prior to the mass releases of internal 
e-mails of both city and state officials in 2016, a column penned by 
Darnell Earley stated,
The decision to separate from Detroit Water and Sewerage Department 
and go with the KWA [Karegnondi Water Authority], which included 
the decision to pump Flint River water in the interim, were part of a 
long-term plan that was approved by Flint’s mayor and confirmed by 
a City Council vote of 7–1 on March 25, 2013. . . . The mayor’s approval 
of the plan and the subsequent near unanimous vote by City Council 
were in no way coerced, forced or demanded by the state, nor any 
emergency manager. Council’s affirmative vote was supported and 
signed as an Executive Order by then-Emergency Manager Edward 
Kurtz on March 29, 2013.
The title of Earley’s column, “Don’t Blame EM for Flint Water Disaster,” 
clearly demonstrates this article’s communicative purpose. However, 
an email by Harvey Hollins, Michigan’s state director of urban initia-
tives, written 2 weeks prior to Earley’s column, stated unambiguously, 
“It is important to note that council did not take a vote to use Flint 
river” (Ridley, 2016). For Earley to write a column in which he claims 
that not only was there a vote in favor of changing the water source 
but that such a vote was nearly unanimous, 2 weeks after other state 
officials explicitly noted that no vote took place, seems suspicious under 
even the best possible interpretation. Furthermore, the most damning 
instance of a governmental about-face was the purchase of bottled 
water for government staff well before the state of emergency was de-
clared in December 2015. Although officials claim the decision had no 
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relationship whatsoever to the question of lead levels, “management 
and budget department decided to provide water coolers in a Flint state 
office building after the city sent out a notice saying it had been found 
in violation of the state’s Safe Drinking Water Act because of high levels 
of disinfection byproducts” (Oosting, 2016). Ignoring the discussion 
on whether the government knew about the lead, its decision to limit 
its own staff ’s exposure to potentially unsafe water, while telling its 
residents not to worry, demonstrates clear negligence.
This represents the intersection of Flint’s troubled history with 
systemic problems at the governmental level. The State of Michigan 
stripped away Flint’s ability to make these choices for itself, meaning 
those making the decisions would not be affected by the crisis. As that 
crisis unfolded, despite government officials’ knowledge of problems 
with the drinking water, public officials continued to tell the citizens 
of Flint that the water coming through their pipes was safe for con-
sumption. Worse yet, as those citizens sought accountability from their 
government, that government responded by tossing blame back and 
forth, possibly even consciously lying in the process. When considered 
against the backdrop of Flint’s demographics, we see that it was only 
a matter of time before Flint faced such a crisis. Moreover, according 
to Jones (2017),
[the] inability to afford and have access to self-monitoring water quality 
systems, absence of education on poisoning symptoms, lack of finan-
cial resources to just pick up and leave, and low political power and 
economic mobility are all factors that aid in vulnerable communities 
becoming victims to environmental justice.
Brulle and Pellow (2006) explained that the exploitation of the envi-
ronment and human populations are linked because of the functioning 
of the market economy and institutionalized racism, which led in this 
case to environmental racism. As we have emphasized previously, the 
city of Flint changed its water supply from Detroit-supplied water to 
the Flint River solely to reduce costs for the government, even in the 
face of known potential dangers. This initial attention to the bottom 
line, the subsequent wait-and-see approach to potential dangers from 
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Flint River water, the gross mishandling of the crisis, the clear economic 
exploitation through tax liens, and the refusal to replace lead pipes for 
anyone who cannot afford Flint’s astronomic water bills all coalesce to 
demonstrate the relationship of environmental and human exploita-
tion that is environmental racism. While no one in the government 
intentionally tried to poison the people of Flint, attempting to enact a 
color-blind decision-making process, it did poison the people of Flint 
by ignoring the materiality of the situation (Michigan Civil Rights 
Commission, 2017).
Implications for Environmental Justice
Investigations into cases of environmental racism have several implica-
tions for environmental justice and policy. Populations that have the 
highest risks of water poisoning are also the least represented politi-
cally. Additionally, marginalized people who are at greater risk to be 
victims of environmental racism and environmental injustice often 
lack the agency and education to fight back. For this reason, grassroots 
movements are needed to empower these vulnerable populations. We 
have seen from the crisis in Flint that local residents occupying policy-
making positions will not necessarily result in representative decision-
making. For modern and future governments to practice justice for 
marginalized communities, those communities must make their voices 
heard on all levels; they cannot merely rely on good faith from the top. 
Thus any discussion of the Flint Water Crisis would be incomplete 
without consideration of the tactics we can employ to prevent such a 
tragedy from happening again. The separation of these discussions, 
and the consideration of them merely as academic issues, is a privilege 
that is not enjoyed by those who are actually affected by these crises.
Laurent (2011) outlines four goals that must be achieved for com-
munities to become more empowered: (a) People must have the op-
portunity to participate in decisions about activities that may affect 
their environment and/or health, (b) the public’s contribution must 
be able to influence the regulatory agency’s decisions, (c) the public’s 
concerns must be considered in the decision-making process, and (d) 
the decision makers must seek out and facilitate the involvement of the 
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potentially affected. For grassroots movements to be effective at creat-
ing effective policy changes, however, they cannot be a hollow gesture. 
These movements need to make a genuine effort at understanding the 
systemic factors that have led to environmental racism but also the 
lived experiences of those affected by a system of inequality. Other-
wise, these grassroots efforts are simply talking for these marginalized 
groups without considering their perspective, undermining the goal 
of the grassroots efforts and increasing the likelihood that such crises 
will reappear in the near future. The crisis in Flint, combined with the 
insultingly ineffective response to it on both a local and state level, 
demonstrates that we still have much work to do toward enacting 
these goals.
Conclusion
It is imperative that we learn from the mistakes of Flint. We have seen 
the disastrous effects of the failure to acknowledge a history of envi-
ronmental injustice, combined with current negligence and systemic 
racism. Having applied CRT, we conclude that, quite simply, the Flint 
Water Crisis could not have happened in a wealthier, whiter city and 
therefore is a clear case of environmental racism. Flint city and Michigan 
state officials felt they had the political capital to take their disastrous 
wait-and-see approach because their constituents initially lacked the 
political capital to resist. Yet, as the narrative of a scandal emerged and 
solidified, state officials continued to feign a publicly ignorant about-
face, lobbing blame back on the city officials they had stripped power 
from in the first place.
Lost amid this political bickering is an entire generation who will 
face countless health problems from which they have little to no hope 
of recovery. However, it is possible to change this narrative for future 
generations, but it starts when we stop ignoring marginalized commu-
nities when they have concerns. We cannot simply wait and see when 
an entire community raises its voice in resistance to the status quo. 
Rather, we must consider their perspective, because it can help lead 
to a greater understanding about particular crises. Flint is a tragedy, 
but to prevent future ones, we must start giving marginalized groups 
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a seat at the table, increasing their agency regarding decisions about 
their health and environment.
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